چکیده:
در فهم متعارف، مؤلف، با بهرهگیری از ابزار زبان، قصد و نیت خود را گزارش میکند و بر همین مبنا، تفسیر عبارت است از دستیابی به نیت مؤلف. نظریۀ حقوقی متعارف نیز در فرایند تفسیر همواره در پی کشف نیت قانونگذار است. اما در فهم پساساختارگرا، زبان، صرفاً شیوهای برای نامیدن چیزهای از قبل موجود و ایدههای ذهنی مؤلف نیست، بلکه مقدم بر وجود چیزهاست و دستیابی به چیزها بدون وساطت زبان غیرممکن است. بر این مبنا، تفسیر دیگر نه کشف نیت مؤلف، بلکه تحمیل یک معنا بر متن است. قاضی با تفسیر قانون، از میان گفتمانهای موجود و متخاصم پیرامون موضوع، که تلاش دارند معنایی را به متن نسبت دهند، یکی از آنها را برمیگزیند و سایر معانی موجود را طرد میکند. این نگاه به زبان، ادعای نصبودگی متن را بهسادگی برنمیتابد و با گسترش افق گفتمانی متن، راه را برای استمرار فرایند خوانش باز میگذارد.
In common sense concepts, language is assumed to represent and report
something that happened in the past independently of the language. An
author uses language to communicate his intentions. Interpretation thus can
be understood as an attempt to understand those intentions. According to the
lawyers' formal understanding of the "language", the formal theory of law
aims to "interpret" and "understand" the text of the laws, to discover the
author's intention and will, and to introduce the criteria for the truth of our
interpretation of the law according to the author's intention; however, the
"reality" of the text is the very intention and meaning that the author
intended and buried in the world of the text , and, the reader must "discover"
and extract this intention. If the reader's interpretation "corresponds" to the
reality of the text (the will of the legislator), this interpretation is "true" and
"valid", otherwise it is "false".
In the poststructuralist approach, however, language is not considered
merely as a means of naming objects that existed in the past or events that
occurred in the past. Rather, language is assumed to precede the existence of
objects. That is, the understanding of objects would not be possible without
language. The emphasis by post-structuralism on the constructive role of
"language" is the basis for considering "discourse" as the source and
repository of "meaning." Poststructuralists seek the meaning of words
(signs) and texts not in the mind of the author, but in the discourses that
revolve around the texts, each of which attempts to "impose" its desired
meaning on the text. Poststructuralist discourse theory provides the legal
scholar with a vocabulary (such as "central signifier," "articulation,"
"element," "moment," "objectivity," etc.) that can be used by the researcher
provided, of course, that poststructuralist principles are adhered to.
Poststructuralist ideas such as the constructive role of language and the
uncertainty of meaning can help analyzing discourse conflicts in the
geography of law around important legal concepts.
This study uses an analytic-descriptive method to argue that a
poststructuralist understanding of language and discourse can bring new
insights to legal methodology, in both descriptive and prescriptive senses.
Descriptively, in this view, interpretation is not about uncovering an author's
intentions, or giving the text a single meaning (e.g., one that has been
established and authorized by a religious or political authority). In statutory
interpretation, a judge chooses one of the competing interpretations of the
text and rejects the alternatives. To ascribe meaning to a text is always to
"reject" other meanings that other discourses attempt to ascribe to the text or
sign. This "rejection," however, is not permanent. Rejected meanings are
still in play and return to the text. Any dominant and "hegemonic" discourse
can be toppled from the throne of power: The game of discourses and the
attribution of meanings to words is not over. Prescriptively, this view resists
textualism and the domination of explicit meaning. Rather, it expands the
discursive horizon of the text by critiquing the principles of conventional
understanding in the process of reading, thus paving the way for the
continuation of the reading process. The Islamic jurisprudence puts the
explicit meaning in the foreground, but because it is aware of the
shortcomings and inadequacies of language and the scarcity of the clear text,
it does not put all its eggs in one basket and also relies on the apparent
meaning: The theory of primacy of the apparent meaning is the main
principle of interpretation in Islamic jurisprudence, which, as claimed, relies
on the the consensus of the wise people. Post-structuralism considers the
apparent meaning of the text as a product of the dominant discourse and
does not grant it any authority. It considers rejected discourses as important
as the dominant and hegemonic discourse. The deconstructive approach of
post-structuralism requires us to view with skepticism any claim to
dominance and semantic certainty, such as the authority of explicit and
apparent meaning. This approach gives discarded and marginalized
discourses the opportunity to return to the game of meanings. Using a
prescriptive approach, this study proposes to bring all discourses that have
been rejected into play in the reading process and to expand the discursive
horizon of the text: "Let the others speak.